I. Introduction
In an open innovation system, a technology transfer (hereafter TT) activity can be an efficient strategy for firms. Specially, it is more important as recent innovation shows shorter life cycle and higher costs. 1) However, there must be the asymmetries of information between licensor and licensee in every TT, which caused its performance to be below the expected level.
For this reason, the contracting parties include many complicated clauses to design TT contracts such as types of payment, provisions of governance, terms of renegotiation and duration, safeguard for exclusivity, usage restriction and grant-back and so on.
This study is focusing on various payment mechanisms in TT agreement. Much scholarly work has paid attention to them as the instruments to reduce asymmetric information between licensor and licensee. As a result, the optimal choice of a payment mechanism can lead to the successful commercialization of transferred technologies. Assuming risk neutrality and no additional effort by the inventor or licensor, for example, a simple upfront fee can be optimal. 2) However, in the circumstance without this assumption, some forms of output-contingent payment can mitigate the moral hazard problems by linking the licensor's revenue to its effort and the future outcomes of the transferred technology.
Because the inventor's effort increases the probability of commercial success, the licensor who expects marginal benefits from its efforts is incentivized to contribute to the commercialization project of transferred technology.
However, these individual types of payments are not perfect mechanism to control asymmetric information in TT agreements. For example, an output contingent payment can cause the licensee to commit shelving problem if his intention to TT is just to prevent his rivals from obtaining the technology, or if the future return after TT agreement is expected to be less than what was originally anticipated. Similarly, because fixed payment does not include any reward for licensor's effort to commercialize transferred technology, fixed payment, it can cause the licensor to shirk the transferred technologies. 3) As a result, a two-part tariff to combine fixed and output contingent payment can be the optimal terms of compensation to minimize the information asymmetry in TT agreements.
The objective of this study is to verify whether the types of payment mechanism show different performance for the licensee by playing a role of controller to reduce asymmetric information in TT agreements. This study investigates the excess return of the licensee's stock price around the day to announce the news of TT agreements. This measure is based on the assumption of an efficient capital market.
In this paper, Section 2 reviews the previous studies on the factors affecting the choice of payment mechanism in TT agreement and its evaluation from the viewpoint of capital markets. Section 3 designs the econometric model, describes the data set and variables, and displays the descriptive statistics. Section 4 interprets the results of the regression model. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the study, and suggests implications and limitations.
II. Theoretical Background

Factors affecting the choice of payment mechanism
Payment mechanisms in TT can be categorized into one or a combination of upfront lump-sum fees, royalties, milestone payment, and equity grants. With upfront lump-sum and annual fees, first of all, the licensee has to pay an agreed amount of fixed costs. And a royalty represents the payment that is proportional to revenues received from the output. A milestone payment is also based on the outcome of the licensee, compensating the licensor at every achievement of some stipulated events in terms of sales or development stage. In addition, licensees may grant their own equities instead of paying large amounts of upfront fees.
The choice of optimal payment in a TT agreement has been based on the competition in output markets, the attitudes to the uncertainties of licensee and licensor, and other characteristics such as corporate governance, financial condition and reputation. Much scholarly work 4) has suggested the factors affecting the choice of a payment type based on fixed payment (lump-sum) and output contingent payment (royalty, milestone, equitygrant).
First of all, in terms of market competition, when a licensee already holds monopolistic power in the output market or gets unrestricted use of transferred technology, the licensee wishes the remuneration through a 
Evaluation of TT agreement in terms of the response of capital market
Based on the assumption of efficient capital markets, much scholarly work 21) has assessed various strategic alliances including R&D investment, marketing strategies and technology licensing contracts based on the response of stock market.
In a TT agreement, despite no direct evidence, capital markets assess it based on the characteristics of licensee and licensor, and IP protection in the market of the licensee and so on. First of all, Elllott However, unlike Schachter and Huston (2005) , they seem to prefer a mixed And showing a significant and higher value in output contingent payment, the estimate of SALES implies that the high growth of a licensee motivates a licensor to choose output contingent payment by expecting to extract more benefits from commercialization of the licensee than fixed payment. The significance of UNCERTAINTY meaning a high return and risk of a licensee in choosing mixed payment implies that high uncertainties do not only urge the licensee to avoid the fixed payment causing corporate value to be negatively unstable, and but they also make the licensor avoid the output contingent payment involving more future risk than return.
Even though the above results are supported by previous studies, and also seem reasonable from intuition, the other attributes such as the type of licensor and the degree of IP protection are not recognized as significant factors affecting the choice of payment mechanisms.
In addition, there exists no evidence of Schachter and Huston 31) that universities and corporations prefer fixed and output contingent payment respectively. This is because there have been no definite style for universities, corporations or foreign institutions to prefer as the number of TT agreements increases at heterogenous environment. For example, universities increase to adopt output contingent payment more frequently, especially by equity licensing, as they come to realize the benefits of output contingent deals. 32) Specially, Table 4 shows that the contract with public research institutes are based on more mixed payments. However, there is no evidence on the effect of IP protection. It might be due to measurement error by the strong assumption that industrial classification is closely related to IP protection.
In summary, even though some evidence debated in previous studies cannot be confirmed, <Table 4> empirically confirms that the characteristics of licensee such as age, sales, profitability and uncertainty serve as the distinctive factors in choosing the payment mechanism in TT agreement. distinctive response of capital markets to these three payment mechanisms.
Response of public capital market
Specially, designing a two-equation system model to treat the endogeneity problem caused by OLS regression model, this study offers additional information on the preference of licensee and licensor about three terms of payment as well as more consistent estimates.
With respect to the motivation to choose a payment mechanism, fixed payments appeal to the licensee with more cash reserves, and output contingent payments appeal to the licensor which contracts with highly growing licensee. These results can be interpreted from the strategy of licensee and licensor to extract future benefit from commercialization. In addition, the contract with high uncertainties is based on mixed payments, which is inferred from the conflicts of interest that the licensee wishes to avoid short-term damage through output contingent payment while the licensor hopes to remove long-term risk through fixed payment.
With regard to the response of capital markets, this study has following implications. First of all, as a main finding, the participants in TT activities need to understand the role of payment mechanisms not only as a financial option to manage financial resources, but also as a control instrument to minimize the moral hazard and adverse selection problem. Additionally, showing the lower assessment of TT activities from public research institutes compared to those from domestic universities and international corporations, the result suggests the public TT market is oriented to favor of private capital market. And from the low evaluation of TT activities from chemical and pharmaceutical, and IT software industry, the result implies that there might not be no relationship between IP protection and the attraction of capital markets, but the weak IP protection even in chemical and pharmaceutical industries, requiring stronger IP policy.
Limitation and future works
Due to small sample, the classification of payment mechanism is too restrictive to highlight the distinctive characteristics of a payment mechanism within each subcategory. For instance, pointing out an inefficiency of royalty payment to control moral hazard of licensor, a few studies 34) have considered a milestone as an optimal mechanism in output contingent payments. Additionally, addressing the limitation of the milestone to control the shelving problem of licensee, Thursby et al. 35) consider the contract mixing annual payments and milestones as an optimal one against information asymmetry between licensee and licensor. Feldman et al. 36) have insisted that compared to traditional royalty-based license, equity-based deal cannot only provide the licensor with more opportunities to share the fortune of the licensee, but also appeal to capital market or strategic partners. That is to say, based on more detailed classification, future study should describe more various aspects of TT agreement, and suggest more sophisticate evidence on its role.
In addition, TT agreement is recognized to be a non-linear process between licensee and licensor simultaneously considering more various clauses such as provisions on governance, the terms of renegotiation and duration, and safeguards clauses regarding exclusivity, usage restriction and grant-back as well as the terms of payment. For this reason, in spite of more advanced econometric approaches, the model in this study might be restrictive by not considering the endogeneity problem caused by the above factors. contracts to announce in equity market. This may induce sample selection bias, and cause the econometric approach in this study to be still unstable.
In spite of these limitations, this study has originality not only in contributing to sparse empirical studies on TT, but also in shedding light on the role of payment terms in perspective of information asymmetry, especially based on the assessment of capital markets.
